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Liberty, Markets and Environmental Values: A Hayekian Defence of 
Free Market Environmentalism 
 
Introduction 
In recent years the development of ‘free market environmentalism’ has 
marked a major advance in the relationship between the classical liberal  
tradition and the challenge to individualist institutions presented by the 
modern environmental movement. Building on the work of Coase and the 
New Institutional Economics free market environmentalism has 
demonstrated that, far from being the inevitable result of market 
institutions environmental problems are best explained by the absence of 
these very institutions. Notwithstanding these advances, however, free 
market environmentalism has failed to have a significant impact on the 
environmental movement. Indeed, in so far as there has been any reaction 
to proposals for the extension of private property rights, these have 
tended to be hostile.  
  
One of the reasons for this lack of progress stems from the differing 
social ontologies adopted by the proponents of environmental markets 
and the green political theorists and activists who tend to favour 
command and control models of environmental regulation. The former 
have a tendency to emphasise notions of rational self interest, utility 
maximisation and efficiency, whilst the latter focus on communitarian 
conceptions which emphasise a non-reductionist account of social 
interaction and a ‘moralistic’ approach to environmental issues that seeks 
to institutionalise a search for the ‘common good’. 
 
Whilst recognising the contribution of rational choice analysis, this paper 
argues that free market environmentalism is unlikely to make political 
progress unless its arguments are recast in a mode that addresses the 
communitarian greens on their own terms. One way of achieving this goal 
is to restate the case for free market environmentalism from a Hayekian 
perspective. This paper attempts to move the debate in this direction by 
showing that the conclusions of Hayekian liberalism are more consistent 
with the non-reductionist foundations of green communitarianism than 
those of the communitarians themselves. The argument is structured in 
three parts. Section one, sets out the communitarian critique of free 
market environmentalism. Section two outlines the essentials of Hayekian 
liberalism and its similarities and differences with communitarian 
ontology. Finally, section three offers a Hayekian defence of free market 
environmentalism against the central claims of green communitarian 
thought.   3
Free Market Environmentalism versus Green Communitarianism 
Inspired by developments in neo-classical welfare economics, for much 
of the post-war period environmental problems were treated as classic 
examples of ‘market failure’. According to this perspective, market 
processes result in socially sub-optimal environmental decisions because 
private decision-makers are not held properly to account for the 
consequences of their actions, owing to the prevalence of collective 
goods and externality problems. Seen in this light the task of 
environmental policy was to devise ways of correcting for imbalances in 
the market system via the judicious use of taxes, subsidies and regulatory 
controls in order to ensure the appropriate provision of environmental 
goods. 
 
The emergence of free market environmentalism represents a significant 
advance in terms of the way that environmental problems are now 
conceived. Building on the work of Coase (1960), Demsetz (1969) and 
developments in public choice theory, free market environmentalism 
suggests that the mere identification of market failures is not a sufficient 
justification to warrant widespread government intervention. In so far as 
markets are prone to ‘fail’ in the environmental sphere, the principal 
reason for this is the high cost of establishing property rights. It is these 
obstacles to market exchange or transaction costs that prevent the 
successful internalisation of costs. Transaction costs are not, however, the 
sole preserve of the market system and it is to commit the ‘nirvana 
fallacy’ to suggest that the alternative to an imperfect market is a 
government immune from these same costs. Public choice theory, in 
particular suggests that the interaction of voters, interest groups, 
politicians and bureaucrats, is characterised by a distinctive set of 
transaction costs that may result in chronic examples of ‘government 
failure’. What is needed, therefore, is a comparative framework that 
examines the extent to which institutional provisions in the private and 
public sectors encourage or inhibit the internalisation of costs. 
 
It is in the above context, that free market environmentalism has made a 
strong case for much greater use of property rights solutions and 
‘imperfect’ market processes as an alternative to the regulatory state. On 
the one hand, authors such as Anderson and Leal (2001) have 
documented numerous examples of environmental goods that can be and 
are supplied successfully in private markets, whilst on the other, 
empirical research examining state centred models of environmental 
management has highlighted numerous cases of government failure. In 
the case of land based environmental assets such as forests and mineral 
rights, for example, evidence suggests that private property solutions are   4
highly successful in generating the necessary incentives that encourage 
resource conservation and help to overcome the problems of ‘free–riding’ 
associated with open access conditions (De Alessi, 2003). Thus, the 
record of forest management in Sweden under a predominantly private 
regime has been noticeably more impressive than the experience of 
government ownership in the United States, Canada and Britain. 
Similarly, the private ownership of wildlife in countries such as Botswana 
has had markedly more success in protecting stocks than the record of 
trade bans on ivory products that have been pursued over much of the 
African continent (Sugg and Kreuter, 1994). 
 
Whilst proponents of free market environmentalism recognise that there 
are limits to environmental markets owing to the prevalence of 
transaction costs, they contend that these problems are more likely to be 
overcome within an institutional framework that is supportive of private 
contractual arrangements. According to this perspective, all 
environmental externalities represent potential profit opportunities for 
entrepreneurs who are able to devise ways of defining property rights and 
arranging contracts (via technological innovations, for example), so that 
those currently ‘free riding’ on collective goods or imposing negative 
external effects (e.g. pollution) on their neighbours are required to pay for 
the actions concerned. A land owner may, for example, introduce fences 
and install entrance points to the grounds of a park in order to exclude 
non-payers from the aesthetic benefits that the park provides. Likewise, if 
technologies develop in the future which will enable the ‘fencing’ of the 
atmosphere, then there will be incentives for entrepreneurs to define 
property rights to the air and to charge those who are currently polluting 
‘for free’. In the market economy, therefore, if people are imposing costs 
on others, or benefiting from the provision of certain goods without 
payment there are always incentives for entrepreneurs to find ways of 
eliminating such involuntary transfers over time. 
 
The political process, by contrast, tends in it very nature to externalise 
costs through the coercive mechanisms of collective decision. The all or 
nothing nature of political decision-making means that once a majority 
coalition has been assembled costs can be imposed on those who do not 
form part of the ruling group. There is, as a consequence, always an 
incentive for politicians to find ways of externalising costs, providing 
benefits to some groups at the direct expense of others. In light of these 
incentives advocates of free market environmentalism suggest that we 
should rely on government action only in those situations where it is 
inconceivable that a market solution might be forthcoming. At present, 
for example, the issue of trans-boundary air quality management would   5
seem to fall into this category. As yet, technological developments are not 
sufficient to enable the effective ‘fencing’ of atmospheric resources and 
as a consequence government action may be warranted as a last resort.  
 
Recognising the limits of property rights solutions in this regard free 
market environmentalism argues nonetheless, that ‘market-like’ 
incentives such as tradable permit schemes be built into whatever policy 
interventions are required, rather than the adoption of a ‘command and 
control’ approach. According to this perspective, command and control 
policies such as fixed emission quotas, do not provide sufficient 
incentives to deliver improvements in environmental quality beyond those 
specified by government mandates. Market like approaches such as 
tradable permits by contrast give externalities a ‘price tag’, which can be 
reduced via a process of substitution. Thus, in the case of tradable 
pollution permits, if a firm reduces its emissions below its allocated 
quota, then it can sell on the un-needed share of its quota to less efficient 
firms. In turn, because the more efficient firms have a positive incentive 
to continue reducing pollution, there is less need for the state to employ 
armies of inspectors to ensure compliance with the law. 
 
Notwithstanding the substantial body of evidence to support the case for 
free market environmentalism, the approach has made precious little 
headway in both policy terms and with regard to developments in green 
political theory. Whilst some green theorists are now willing to concede 
that certain environmental goods can be supplied via private markets they 
reject the view that these goods should in fact be provided in such a way.  
Similarly, whilst many greens are willing to concede the ‘efficiency’ case 
for tradable permits and other ‘market-like’ instruments, they continue to 
favour a reliance on ‘command and control’ policy tools. The basis of 
these objections rests on the contention that the rational choice model of 
decision-making is entirely inappropriate to the nature of the issues in 
hand. In making these claims green political theory draws heavily on the 
communitarian critique of market liberalism that has come to the fore 
over the last twenty years.
1 
 
At the core of communitarian objections to the use of environmental 
markets is a belief that support for market processes presupposes that the 
purpose of social institutions is to facilitate the efficient satisfaction of 
individual preferences. From a communitarian perspective such an 
                                                           
1  In using this term, I do not intend to imply that all people describing themselves as ‘green’ are 
communitarians. Nonetheless the term does capture a range of arguments that constitute a majority of 
green opinion, covering the so called ‘social ecology’ school, the ‘deep ecology’ school and a large 
body of green opinion which is influenced by the Frankfurt school of ‘critical theory’. For a critique of 
the latter from a Hayekian perspective, see Pennington (2001).   6
approach is neglectful of the moral context in which individual 
preferences are shaped and formed and eschews any sense of the 
‘common good’. MacIntyre (1984), for example, argues that liberalism 
reduces ethical questions to matters of personal preference, in such a way 
that morality becomes an entirely relativistic concept. In so far as liberals 
have a conception of the ‘common good’ this is seen to reflect the 
aggregate sum of individual preferences. As MacIntyre points out, 
however, without some overarching sense of morality that transcends the 
individual actor, liberalism is a potentially self-destructive ideology, since 
principles such as respect for private property themselves become matters 
of purely personal preference. 
 
In response to such deficiencies, communitarians argue that the individual 
should be conceived as a thoroughly social being whose preferences are 
derived from a relationship to a shared or inter-subjective conception of 
the good reflective of the community as a whole. The ‘common good’, 
therefore, should provide a standard through which the virtue of 
individual preferences can properly be judged. According to this view, 
the ‘selfishness’ of market driven consumerism must be kept in its place, 
since the ‘exit’ mechanisms that pervade markets allow people to 
‘disconnect’ from their communities and fail to relate their choices to a 
shared conception of the good (see, for example, Barber, 1984; Sunstein, 
1991). By contrast, democratic deliberation and collective choice in the 
‘public realm’ it is argued, enables individuals to educate their values 
through a dialogue where the virtue of preferences can be judged by the 
community, according to the articulation of the ‘best reasons’. 
 
Applying such arguments in the environmental sphere green political 
theorists contend that environmental problems are quintessential 
collective goods that can only be dealt with via institutions that transcend 
a concern for individual preference. There are several dimensions to this 
line of thought.  
 
First, it is argued that environmental problems are ‘systemic’ in nature 
and cannot be dealt with effectively via approaches that treat individual 
issues in isolation from others (see, for example, Dryzek, 1987; Barry, 
1999; Smith 2003). Ecological systems are complex inter-related wholes 
where decisions that affect one particular dimension (such as land 
management) will inevitably ripple outwards to affect other aspects of the 
human/ecological interface (such as water management). Since ecological 
processes encapsulate the notion that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts’, environmental decisions should be based on more ‘holistic’ 
decision practices where concerned citizens can collectively analyse how   7
their choices affect and impinge on the lives and environment of others. 
A focus on market freedom it is argued ‘atomises’ individual decisions 
and discourages people from thinking about how their behaviour affects 
the health of the community as a whole. 
 
A second and related objection to free market environmentalism derives 
from its focus on incentives. Seen in this light, property rights approaches 
emphasise the personal gains to be made from environmental protection 
rather than encouraging people to reflect on the moral virtue of 
ecologically sensitive behaviour. The focus on individual incentives in 
those cases where it is possible to supply environmental goods via the 
market, therefore, is likely to intensify prisoners’ dilemma type problems 
where it is not possible for markets to deliver such goods owing to the 
culture of ‘selfishness’ that these institutions perpetuate (Jacobs, 1997). 
Command and control models of regulation, by contrast, are it is 
suggested more likely to inculcate ‘other regarding’ behaviour by 
enforcing a communal conception of morally appropriate resource use. 
 
A third and final set of objections to free market environmentalism 
maintains that individual willingness to pay is simply not a valid criterion 
for a large a number of goods deemed to reflect fundamental moral and 
ethical values, which cannot be bought or sold. According to this view 
free market environmentalism takes individual preferences as fixed and 
pre-given and thus neglects the possibility that people can be educated to 
an appreciation of alternative lifestyles given a context that encourages 
debate and argument rather than a consumerist gratification of individual 
wants (see, for example, Barry, 1999).  
 
Moreover, from the perspective of green communitarianism, the use of a 
common denominator such as money to aggregate individual preferences 
into an ‘efficient’ social welfare function, is entirely inappropriate where 
there are incommensurable moral ends involved and where the 
aggregation of conflicting values is, therefore, impossible. Moral 
conflicts over resource use should not be considered according to the 
utilitarian criterion of willingness to pay, but should instead be dealt with 
via democratic debate and compromise (see, for example, Smith 2003). 
The analogy invoked here is with scientific conceptions of truth, where it 
is usually considered inappropriate to decide the merits of competing 
theories according to the intensity of individual preferences. Likewise, for 
communitarian greens the ethical value of environmental public goods 
should be resolved via collective judgement in accordance with the 
‘power of the better argument’ and not via a willingness to pay. 
   8
The overall essence of the green communitarian case is captured in the 
distinction drawn by Mark Sagoff, between ‘consumer’ and ‘citizen’ 
preferences. When asking a group of students if they would visit a new 
ski resort proposed for construction in a National Park, Sagoff notes that 
the majority of respondents indicated that they would gladly visit the 
resort to benefit from the recreational opportunities. When asking the 
same group of individuals whether they would in fact support the 
construction of the relevant resort, however, many of the individuals 
replied in the negative. For Sagoff, the difference between these 
responses is a reflection of the distinction between consumer and citizen 
preferences. As participants in a market for amoral consumer goods 
individuals welcomed the opportunity for new skiing facilities to satisfy 
their individual recreational wants. In their capacity as critical moral 
citizens, however, the same individuals were morally opposed to the 
destruction of valued wilderness, which was considered of value to their 
community as a whole. If we do not want to live in a degraded 
environment, therefore, then more often than not we should choose 
collective citizen deliberation over individual consumer choice.  
 
 
                                                          
F.A. Hayek: The Liberal as Communitarian
2 
It is evident from the above sketch that much of the objection to free 
market environmentalism stems not from concerns about the practicality 
of market solutions to environmental issues but from a rejection of the 
ontological framework from which these solutions derive. Green political 
theorists and activists are unlikely to accept proposals grounded in the 
assumptions of rational choice theory. As a consequence, much of the 
debate between the proponents of free market environmentalism and 
communitarian greens resembles a dialogue of the deaf. The latter is 
notably apparent in some recent exchanges between Mark Sagoff and 
Terry Anderson and Donald Leal. According to Sagoff (1994), free 
market environmentalism relies on an aggregate conception of allocative 
efficiency, scarcely distinguishable from neo-classical welfare economics 
and fails to recognise that environmentalists are concerned not with 
efficiency but with the moral status of conserving the natural world. For 
their part, meanwhile, Anderson and Leal (2001,p.24) accuse Sagoff of 
providing little more than a sophisticated apology for a disguised form of 
rent seeking by environmental campaigners. 
 
I do not, in this paper, intend to debate the virtues of the rational choice 
model or to engage too deeply in the debate between ‘liberals’ and 
 
2 I borrow this phrase from the title of an excellent review article, which compares and contrasts 
Hayekian liberalism with the main elements of communitarian thought –see McCann (2002).   9
‘communitarians’ that has raged over recent years. Having worked from 
within a liberal rational choice perspective myself (see, for example 
Pennington, 2000), I simply note that many of the objections to this 
account of human behaviour are weak and can be dealt with from inside 
the rational choice framework itself (see, for example Epstein, 2003). 
Rather, my purpose here is to demonstrate that even if one accepts all the 
communitarian arguments against rational choice liberalism, none of 
these arguments provides an effective case against market institutions and 
environmental markets in particular. On the contrary, a Hayekian 
perspective shares many of the ontological assumptions of communitarian 
thought and yet provides a radical endorsement of the case for private 
markets. This section sketches the similarities and differences between 
Hayek’s liberalism and modern theories of communitarianism. The 
subsequent section applies these Hayekian concepts to mount a defence 




The most immediate similarity between Hayekian liberalism and 
communitarian thinking is evident in the notion of ‘true’ individualism. 
The latter acknowledges that individuals are inherently social creatures 
(or ‘situated selves’ to use communitarian terminology), who acquire 
many of their preferences, values and practices via a process of emulation 
and imitation. For Hayek, true individualism is to be distinguished from 
the ‘false’ individualism, which conceives of society as the rational 
creation of individuals seeking to design optimal social institutions.  
 
“This fact should by itself be sufficient to refute the silliest of misunderstandings: the 
belief that individualism postulates (or bases its arguments on the assumption of) the 
existence of isolated or self-contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose 
whole nature and character is determined by their existence in society.” (Hayek, 
1948a, p.6). 
 
To recognise that people are a product of their society is not, however, to 
imply that society is itself the result of deliberate human action. On the 
contrary, the social and cultural environment is largely the unintended by-
product of many individual acts, the effects of which are beyond the 
purview of any one actor or group. For Hayek, the defining feature of the 
individual as a social being is her incapacity to comprehend more than a 
tiny proportion of the society of which she is a part owing to the 
constitutional limits of the human mind. Individuals and organisations are 
                                                           
3 It should be recognised that Anderson and Leal do make excellent use of Hayek’s work at various 
points in Free Market Environmentalism. They fail however to set these arguments in a broader 
philosophical/ epistemological context and as a consequence do not address the arguments of Sagoff 
and other communitarian greens on their own terms.    10
situated within much larger ‘spontaneous ordering’ processes the results 
of which are far greater than, and hence beyond the comprehension of 
their constituent parts. Language, for example, whilst developing out of 
the human capacity for communication, emerges as the unintended by-
product of multiple communicative acts. As new words and combinations 
spread via a process of imitation and adaptation, their initiators are not 
consciously aware of how such practices will be used and adapted by 
others. Similarly, the users of language are typically unaware of the 
multiple individual nodes that have initiated the words and phrases in 
common usage and the ‘reasons’ why such symbols have been adopted. It 
is in the latter sense that complex social wholes such as language are 
‘greater than the sum of their parts.’ 
 
Seen through this lens, whilst communitarians are right to emphasise the 
socially ‘situated’ nature of the individual, they are in error when 
suggesting that ‘community’ is something that advances via conscious 
deliberation. From a Hayekian perspective, the content of community is 
not something that can be consciously articulated, but is an emergent 
property from the interactions of many individuals and groups. This anti-
intentionalist account of societal development does not, as if often 
suggested by critics of ‘invisible hand’ theories, reduce social explanation 
to one of mere accident. On the contrary, the central claim of the 
Hayekian perspective is that in order to operate in a social world, more 
complex than can be directly perceived, individuals must rely on 
spontaneous ordering processes in order to achieve an effective level of 
social co-ordination. If social wholes are indeed ‘greater than the sum of 
their parts’ then it follows that the constituent elements, even when acting 
as an organised group via institutions such as the state, can never 
comprehend all of the factors that contribute to the advance of the whole.  
 
From a Hayekian perspective, ‘community’ involves the relations of 
shared identification, morals and commitments associated with 
observance of spontaneously evolving cultural rules, including language 
and social mores such as respect for private property. In accordance with 
communitarian accounts of ethics, therefore, morality transcends the 
individual actor and is not reduced to a matter of personal preference. 
Nonetheless, while individuals identify themselves through the social 
practices in which they are embedded communitarians are wrong to 
suggest that individual actors are consciously involved in the pursuit of 
some ‘communal end’. When understood as a spontaneous order or 
catallaxy the community cannot be considered to have ends of its own. 
To speak of a ‘communal end’ would require that society operate as an 
instrumental organisation, a sort of ‘super-person’ that defines the ends of   11
its citizens. The latter conception of social order, favoured by 
communitarians is, according to Hayek, only appropriate to a tribal 
society operating according to a narrowly defined set of goals. It is, 
however, wholly inappropriate to an ‘open society’ where people have 
communal attachments to the cultural rules and practices which order 
their behaviour, whilst also having the liberty to experiment in the pursuit 
of a wider variety of different ends. 
 
The emphasis on spontaneous order and a non-intentionalist account of 
social co-ordination assume pride of place in Hayek’s economics and in 
particular his defence of market institutions and critique of socialist 
planning. For Hayek, market processes perform two crucial functions that 
cannot be replicated by deliberate social planning.  
 
First, market prices communicate in coded form, the ‘circumstances of 
time and place’ affecting dispersed individuals and organisations that can 
never be comprehended in their entirety (Hayek, 1948, b and c). Shifts in 
the structure of relative prices may reflect changes in tastes, ethical 
values, the availability of new substitutes, entrepreneurial innovations and 
all manner of context specific factors, known only to those engaged in a 
particular exchange. What is crucial, is that in order to change their 
production or consumption patterns actors need not know anything about 
the complex of events that contributes to a rise or fall in price - all they 
need to know is that the price has changed. For a government planning 
mechanism to achieve an equivalent level of co-ordination would require 
that an organised group be consciously aware of all the relevant facts 
necessary to secure the dovetailing of the multitude components that form 
a complex economy. It is, however, the cognitive inability of such a 
group to access the constantly changing circumstances of individuals and 
firms that prevents conscious co-ordination of this type.  
 
As well as enabling people to adjust their behaviour to changing patterns 
of relative scarcity, the market economy also acts as a creative procedure 
in which the content of scarcity, of ‘which goods are scarce goods’ is 
itself discovered and disseminated via a process of competitive emulation 
(Hayek, 1948c, 1978). On the supply side each entrepreneurial act, such 
as the offering of a new product or mode of organisation actively creates 
new knowledge that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. The resultant 
profits (and losses) may then be spotted by other firms who imitate the 
behaviour of the successful and learn not to make the same errors as the 
unsuccessful. On the demand side meanwhile, consumers learn about new 
goods and prices via a snowballing process as individuals emulate the 
purchases of their neighbours and learn about new ways of living by   12
observing the competing goods displayed in catalogues or 
advertisements. From a Hayekian perspective, government planners could 
never perceive and respond to all the different production and 
consumption ideas dispersed ‘in the minds’ of the diversity of decision-
makers who have the freedom to exchange property titles in the market.  
Attempts to set prices by government fiat, therefore, are doomed to 
failure, since the ‘right prices’ are unknowable in the absence of market 
competition and the ‘social division of knowledge’ on which this process 
draws (Hayek, 1948 a, b and c, 1978). 
 
The co-ordination properties of market institutions are not, from a 
Hayekian perspective to be confused with a narrowly utilitarian 
procedure for aggregating individual values into an ‘efficient’ or  
‘optimum’ social outcome. To speak of maximisation or efficiency is 
only appropriate in the context of an individual household, organisation 
or firm operating according to a unitary scale of values and hence of what 
is judged more or less important (Hayek, 1973). Market liberalism does 
not deny the notion of the ‘common good’ or reduce such a conception to 
an aggregation of individual scales of value. On the contrary, a liberal 
market order secures the common good by providing the conditions 
within which individuals are able to pursue a variety of different and 
perhaps incommensurable ends. The virtue of the market economy is not 
its capacity to generate an ‘efficient’ set of decisions, but its ability to 
allow the discovery and pursuit of a range of different and perhaps 
conflicting values. The common good, meanwhile, is facilitated by the 
generation of market prices which enable a process of mutual adjustment 
between people pursuing a diversity ends – an adjustment which 
increases the chance that any one of these ends might successfully be 
achieved (Hayek 1973, pp.114-115).  
 
In concluding this section it is important to note that the Hayekian 
emphasis on spontaneous order does not deny the relevance or value of 
all acts of conscious planning or design in society, but is based instead on 
recognition of the limits to such forms of social control. Firms in a market 
economy, for example, are ‘planning organisations’ that emerge in 
situations where there may be gains to be made from replacing 
spontaneous order with a hierarchy of conscious ‘planning’. There comes 
a point, however, where smaller more flexible competitors exhibit a 
market edge as the cognitive limits of the firm are breached. For Hayek, it 
is because we cannot identify in precise terms the boundaries of 
conscious reason that all acts of conscious planning should be subject to a 
wider process of competitive experimentation. This is not to suggest that 
such processes will always lead to the most desirable outcomes, because   13
bad decisions can never be eliminated from a process based on 
evolutionary trial and error. What it does suggest, however, is that given a 
world characterised by complexity, uncertainty and un-intended 
consequences, a reliance on such processes constitutes a necessary if not 
a sufficient condition for the successful co-ordination of social affairs. 
 
 
A Hayekian Defence of Free Market Environmentalism 
It should be apparent that Hayek’s version of liberalism is not susceptible 
to many of the charges levelled at more orthodox forms of liberal theory 
by communitarians. With its socialised conception of the individual and 
of rationality, ‘true individualism’ is not guilty of the atomistic fallacy. 
Similarly, with its concept of spontaneous order or catallaxy this 
approach cannot be accused of seeing society in narrowly aggregate 
terms. More important, the Hayekian defence of the market makes no 
assumptions about individual motivations. It is not that individuals are 
insufficiently altruistic and lacking the necessary incentives under 
socialism, but that in the absence of the signalling function of market 
prices, they could never possess the appropriate knowledge to adjust their 
behaviour in a manner consistent with the interests of others.  
 
 
The Limits of Social Consciousness 
The latter point is central to Hayekian objections against communitarian 
notions, which suggest that environmental decisions be made collectively 
by citizens who consciously analyse how their actions affect the lives of 
others. From a Hayekian perspective whilst the self is socially ‘situated’ 
the notion of a ‘socially conscious’ citizen is an epistemological 
impossibility. Given the cognitive limits of the mind, individuals and 
groups cannot be aware of all the different ramifications of their actions 
both to themselves and to the wider society. This is not to suggest that 
‘other regarding’ behaviour is itself impossible, but that such action may 
only occur within a small cognitive sphere, confined perhaps to family, 
friends and colleagues. Consumer choices, therefore, are not necessarily 
selfish - a consumer may be seeking out the best value in the market on 
the behalf of friends, colleagues or a charity. Given the cognitive limits of 
the mind, however, the ends about which people know will always be a 
tiny fraction of the needs of dispersed others. The central problem of 
social co-ordination, therefore, is to enable people to adjust to 
circumstances and interests of which they are not directly aware. For 
Hayek, this is precisely the role performed by market generated 
spontaneous order, when it is impossible to be consciously aware of what 
everybody else is doing.    14
 
In light of the above the normative relevance of the communitarian 
distinction between altruistic ‘citizenship’ and selfish ‘consumerism’ 
collapses. To illustrate, consider the earlier example provided by Sagoff, 
where it was argued that ‘consumer’ action to satisfy recreational ‘wants’ 
would favour the construction of a ski resort in a National Park, whereas 
‘citizen’ action would oppose the destruction of unspoilt wilderness, of 
value to the community as a whole. At first sight this seems to illustrate 
the merits of the communitarian case, but on closer inspection the 
example fails to justify the conclusion that Sagoff derives.  
 
Sagoff (1988, p.80) concedes that most environmental decisions are not 
after all, akin to matters of scientific truth, which can be judged ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ on the basis of reasoned argument. Rather, they involve trade-
offs and marginal adjustments between competing values. Even for 
communitarians, therefore, it would seem ‘economic’ factors such as the 
intensity of preferences and the availability of substitutes must be taken 
into account. Thus, 
 
“We must acknowledge, however idealistic we may be, that clean air, workplace 
safety and the like have a price and at some point the additional amount of cleanliness 
or safety may be grossly disproportionate to the goods and services that we must 
forego in order to pay for it…. But how to determine what is appropriate from an 
ethical point of view?” 
 
With specific regard to the ski resort example, therefore, it is not so much 
that people have a community centred objection to ski resorts per se, but 
that they are opposed to the construction of such a venture in a particular 
wilderness area. The underlying problem is to find a mechanism in order 
to decide where new resorts should be allowed to proceed and how many 
there should be. For Sagoff, such decisions should be made through a 
deliberative democratic process based on compromise, and debate. It is 
precisely at this juncture, however, that democratic deliberation faces the 
epistemological problems highlighted by Hayek. Democratic 
representatives can never have access to, or process, the complex of 
factors to adjust the demand for ski resorts accordingly. Information 
pertaining to ethics, local conditions, pressures on land use etc., does not 
exist as a coherent integrated whole. The dispersed ‘bits’ of information 
may, however, be communicated by market prices which transmit context 
specific factors in coded form across the overlapping perspectives of 
many different actors - shifting demand for ski resorts away from more 
environmentally valued and hence relatively more expensive sites, for 
example. Irrespective of whether the participants are acting in ‘consumer’   15
or ‘citizen’ vein, therefore, without a set of relative prices the desired 
process of mutual adjustment is unlikely to be brought about. 
 
The latter point does not deny the existence of alternative forms of mutual 
adjustment that can occur in other networked structures such as linguistic 
communication or even pluralist politics. What it does suggest, however, 
is that there is no effective equivalent to market prices when the 
adjustments required are fine-grained responses to shifting patterns of 
relative scarcity. Absent the common denominator provided by money 
prices, citizens and politicians lack the capacity to make the necessary 
marginal adjustments. How, for example, are politicians to judge whether 
the receipt of a phone call from a citizen is to be given the same weight as 
that of other citizens writing letters or attending demonstrations. Even 
processes of single-issue direct democracy (the preferred method of many 
communitarian greens) provide no means equivalent to money prices of 
adjusting to the intensity of individual valuations. In such processes the 
vote of someone who values a particular good very highly counts for no 
more than that of someone else who places the same good much further 
down her scale of values (Steele, 1992, pp.316-317). 
 
To take the analysis further, it is useful to compare Hayekian arguments 
for a property rights approach to the problem of ‘open access’ 
environmental resources from those associated with rational choice 
versions of economic liberalism. According to the latter, establishing 
private property rights over resources such as water or fish stocks is 
crucial in helping to change the incentives that self interested actors face, 
internalising costs and hence overcoming the ‘free rider’ problem (see, 
for example, Baden and Stroup, 1979). The Hayekian argument for 
property rights and markets is, however, by no means dependent on the 
assumption of individual self-interest and the significance of incentives. 
Suppose an individual is altruistically motivated as a concerned citizen to 
reduce her water consumption to ‘socially responsible’ levels. In the 
absence of property rights and market prices for water there is no way for 
the individual concerned to adjust her consumption to the interests of 
others. As Steele (1992, p.205) points out, faced with this situation even 
the most altruistically inclined person is likely to consume as much water 
as she personally requires because at least she knows that, whereas 
‘socially responsible’ levels of consumption are shrouded in a fog of 
ignorance.
4 Such problems will, of course be multiplied many times over 
                                                           
4 One way of overcoming this problem is to rely on traditional communal rules to regulate resource 
exploitation, as is the case with the ‘common property’ regimes examined in depth by Ostrom (1990). 
Such approaches are more likely to be effective in small scale, isolated economies where resource 
demands are relatively predictable. They are, however, much less suitable in a more complex 
interdependent economic structure where pressures on resource use are subject to considerable   16
when the choice is between the vast array of production and consumption 
possibilities that make up an advanced economy and the complexity of 
their environmental consequences. In short, without the information 
provided by market generated relative prices it will be impossible for 




Preference Elevation and the Market Economy 
From a Hayekian perspective people simply cannot know in some 
collective or deliberative sense how to act in the ‘public good’ and as 
such the claim that ‘other-regarding’ behaviour is more likely to be 
generated via collective choice looks doubtful in the extreme. What is 
equally significant, however, is that many of the educative advantages 
also attributed to communitarian politics may be more likely to arise in 
the private market. If individual preferences are shaped by the social 
environment then for communitarians it follows that the resultant values 
should be subject to a process of democratic criticism and debate where 
the virtue of these values can be examined by the community as a whole. 
Seen through a Hayekian lens this argument rests on a complete non 
sequitur.  
 
‘Pre-given’ or ‘innate’ preferences in human beings are probably 
confined to a few basic desires for food, shelter and sex. As Hayek (1967 
b, p.315) notes,  
 
“ It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that contemporary man, in all fields 
where he has not yet formed firm habits, tends to find out what he wants by looking at 
what his neighbours do and at various displays of goods (physical or in catalogues or 
advertisements) and then choosing what he likes best.” 
 
The vast majority of the goods that people desire, therefore, are things 
which people learn to desire because they see other people enjoying 
them. The desire for literature, for example, is probably not innate, but is 
largely an ‘acquired taste’ derived from the cultural environment (Hayek, 
1967 b). Is it seriously to be suggested, therefore, that the production and 
consumption of literature is to be subject to state control and that the only 
literary values that should be exercised in society are those arrived at via 
majority approval?  The citizen v consumer dichotomy central to 
communitarian thought does not appear to provide clear grounds for 
                                                                                                                                                                      
fluctuation, and where resource demands may vary considerably between actors. In these 
circumstances a flexible set of relative resource prices brought about via trading in private markets is 
more likely to facilitate the necessary mutual adjustment (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). 
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deciding whether such decisions should be subject to social democratic 
procedures. It might, of course, be argued that because environmental 
goods are collective goods that democratic choice mechanisms are the 
most appropriate. This is, however, to reduce the argument for 
‘citizenship’ to a purely technical question of defining the boundaries of a 
collective good. If it turns out that environmental goods can be supplied 
privately then there is no discernible merit in the distinction between 
‘citizen action’ and ‘consumer choice’. 
 
For Hayek, market institutions are evolutionary discovery processes that 
expose people to a wide variety of competing ideas and enable the 
discovery of previously ‘unforeseen’ production and consumption values. 
Market processes allow contradictory ideas to be simultaneously tested 
against one another without the need for majority approval. Employing 
the option of ‘exit’ enables those individuals who dissent from the 
majority to follow their own ideas without impinging on the ability of 
those who support the majority opinion to follow theirs. The market 
process, therefore, allows a greater range of production and consumption 
decisions to be tried and tested and hence brings more knowledge into the 
‘public realm’ than would ever be the case under a strictly majoritarian 
system. As Wholgemuth (1995; 1999) observes, the most that 
majoritarian procedures can do is to conduct consecutive experiments 
where there is only one, or a very few sets of options being tried out at 
any time. Similarly, the most that politicians and interest groups that do 
not form part of the majority can do is to offer verbal critiques of current 
policy platforms. What they cannot do, however, is to actively supply 
alternative packages of goods. The range of plans that may actually be 
implemented, therefore, will necessarily be less than in a context of 
private exchange. 
 
Paradoxical as it may seem the learning advantages of markets stem from 
the fact that they do not rely too heavily on the transmission of 
knowledge via explicit articulation. This is, of course, one of the primary 
complaints raised against markets by communitarians. From a Hayekian 
perspective, however, though discussion is an important way to impart 
knowledge and while it is true that democracy is or should be 
‘government by discussion’, this is not the most important way by which 
people can actually decide what is best (Hayek, 1960, p.110). On the 
contrary, there is a large body of tacit knowledge that can only be 
communicated by multiple examples of private action (doing, rather than 
talking). There is a crucial distinction between the sort of social learning 
that takes place when people enter into a verbal conversation or read a 
written text and that which occurs by observing and emulating the   18
behaviour of others (Horwitz, 1992; Pennington, 2003). The latter is an 
example of learning by results, imitating successful courses of action and 
avoiding unsuccessful ones even when the reasons behind such successes 
and failures cannot explicitly be articulated. The emphasis on explicit 
reasoning in a communitarian democracy is, therefore, likely to stultify 
the dissemination of new values by choking off those forms of tacit 
knowledge that cannot be communicated via the articulate persuasion of 
majorities. 
 
The communitarian claim that the elevation of individual values is more 
likely to occur in a context of collective citizen deliberation is, therefore, 
without foundation. As Michael Polanyi (1951,1957) has shown, the 
spread of knowledge in markets, the arts, science and academia does not 
proceed via collective deliberation but is best advanced when individuals 
and groups have a ‘private sphere’ that secures the freedom to experiment 
with projects that do not conform to majority opinions. In turn, it is 
because of the ‘private freedoms’ exercised in such contexts that the 
prevailing wisdom changes incrementally, over time. With regard to 
‘green’ consumption, for example, it is doubtful whether the massive 
growth in the organic food market that has occurred over recent years, 
would ever have developed if production decisions in the agricultural 
sector had been subject to collectivist procedures. For years, organic food 
was perceived to be the concern of hapless eccentrics. It is, however, 
precisely because private property affords minorities the space to try out 
experimental ideas, the merits of which may be indiscernible (rather than 
simply talking about them) that more and more people are able to emulate 
such role models as the benefits become more visible.
5  
 
This argument does not suggest that the market process will necessarily 
throw up ideas ‘good’ for the environment, but that a process allowing for 
a greater degree of experimental adaptation is more likely to do so than a 
collectivist regime bound by majority decisions. Open-ended discovery 
processes such as the market necessarily allow mistakes and are 
characterised by an element of disequilibrium. Bad decisions cannot be 
eliminated from evolution and are essential to a process characterised by 
trial and error learning. As research conducted since the early 1980s 
suggests, ecosystems are themselves far from static entities (see, for 
example, Botkin, 1990; McCoy and Shreder-Frechete, 1994; Chase, 
1995). Ecological systems are subject to constant change, both ‘natural’ 
and human induced, some of which may be beneficial, some of which 
may be harmful. A process of experimental adaptation akin to that of the 
                                                           
5 A process that may have progressed more speedily were it not for the communitarian justifications so 
frequently advanced in support of the European Union Common Agricultural Policy.   19
market may, therefore, be more appropriate than the notion, favoured by 
communitarian greens (see, for example, Jacobs, 1997), of ‘steering’ a 
‘sustainable development’ path. Indeed, the notion of ‘steering’ may be 
totally inappropriate to the context of a dynamic, open-ended system. The 
essentially unpredictable nature of such systems implies that collectives 
simply cannot know where they are supposed to be going. Experience 
suggests that governments are not in the best position to ‘pick industrial 
winners’, so there is little reason to believe that they will be able to select 
an appropriate development path, ‘sustainable’ or otherwise. 
 
Deliberative democracy is, therefore, unlikely to generate the necessary 
process of evolutionary adaptation appropriate to dynamic 
human/environmental conditions. Indeed, it is not clear that 
communitarian greens are particularly committed to evolutionary learning 
per se. For all the claims made in favour of communication and debate, 
theorists of this persuasion tend to have decidedly strong views about the 
appropriate location of chemicals, of how much people should be allowed 
to travel and of what is to constitute ‘sustainable development.’ Barry 
(1999, p.165), for example, argues that international trade is ‘inherently’ 
unsustainable, whilst for Daly and Cobb (1989, p.277) there must be a 
‘massive program of education’ to re-orient citizens to a preference for 
rural as opposed to urban ways of life. With certainties of this order, the 
parameters for ‘open-ended debate’, seem very limited indeed. 
 
 
The Cash Nexus and Moral Values 
The remaining objection to environmental markets is that willingness to 
pay is simply not a valid criterion for a large number of goods deemed to 
reflect moral and ethical values, which cannot be bought or sold. Again, 
Sagoff’s example about the preservation of wilderness values over ski 
resorts falls clearly into this category. From a Hayekian perspective, 
however, this is a particularly weak line of tack. The fundamental reason 
for instituting property rights over environmental assets is precisely that 
they allow people to say no to inappropriate offers be this for ethical 
grounds or any other reason important to the property owner/s concerned 
– and not to have such judgements made by bureaucrats. Just as one may 
refuse to sell the family home to the highest bidder because of personal 
history/identity, so a property right to a forest or waterway would allow 
individuals and groups not to sell extraction rights if the ‘compensation’ 
offered is inappropriate to the moral attachments concerned. There is for 
example, no evidence to suggest that in societies where monetary 
payment for sexual services is legalised that a higher proportion of the 
population consider prostitution as a valid career option. Moreover, as   20
Epstein (2003) has argued, to outlaw the offer of monetary payments 
where moral issues are involved is to actively devalue the ethical 
fortitude of those individuals who resist monetary inducements.  If cash 
payments are utterly inappropriate then an important social signalling 
function indicating the character and values of different actors is lost, by 
prohibiting such payments from being made (Epstein, 2003,p.157). 
 
Communitarian greens complain that the use of a common denominator 
such as money is inappropriate where there are incommensurable moral 
ends involved and where the aggregation of conflicting values is, 
therefore, impossible. As has already been shown, however, the Hayekian 
case for market prices is not that they facilitate the aggregation of values 
into a yardstick of ‘social welfare’, but that they allow people with 
conflicting ends to engage in an impersonal process of mutual 
adjustment. Critics of money prices appear to have no such qualms about 
the use of a common denominator when it comes to their own 
‘deliberative designs’, all of which resort to some form of majority voting 
(see, for example, Smith, 2003). For the reasons outlines earlier, such 
processes are far less likely to facilitate mutual adjustment than a set of 
market generated relative prices. It is, therefore, erroneous to suggest that 
moral values cannot be reflected by the ‘cash nexus’, since every decision 
not to buy or sell, for whatever reason, will be reflected in the relevant 
markets.
6 Moreover, a case can surely be made that it is precisely with the 
ends that people value most highly that they should be required to make a 
personal sacrifice, including perhaps a material sacrifice. It is ironic that 
communitarian greens urge that people should sacrifice the material 
benefits of growth for a better ‘quality of life’, whilst refusing to 
countenance the possibility that people should be faced directly with the 




This paper has sought to defend the case for a property rights approach to 
issues of environmental protection against the challenge to the liberal 
market presented by green communitarianism. Unlike existing defences 
of free market environmentalism the preceding pages have set out a 
critique of green political theory that addresses the concerns of the 
communitarian greens on their own terms. A Hayekian perspective is 
well suited to perform this task and suggests that a focus on the ‘situated 
self’, the systemic nature of environmental problems and a non-aggregate 
account of social decision practices offers greater support for liberal 
                                                           
6 The notion that the content of relative prices is affected by cultural and moral factors has long been 
recognised in liberal political economy – see, for example, Mill (1848), chapter 5, book 2.   21
markets than for a communitarian ‘citizens’ democracy. In so far as there 
are genuine limits to the extension of private property arrangements, 
these should be judged on an evaluation of the logistical obstacles to 
environmental markets and not on the spurious distinction between the 
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